The Hypothetical Witness in Gorgias and Antiphon by Gatt, Jurgen R.
Sapiens ubique civis 2 (2021) ISSN 2732-317X 
DOI: 10.14232/suc.2021.2.45-68 
JURGEN R. GATT 
University of Malta 
The Hypothetical Witness in Gorgias and Antiphon 
The paper below focuses on the shadowy figure of the hypothetical witness found in 
two mock-forensic works of the late 5th century: Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes 
and Antiphon’s First Tetralogy. I argue that these witnesses, who only exist within 
the εἰκός arguments found in these speeches, are consistently characterized in im-
personal ways, as individuals with knowledge pertinent to the resolution of the case. 
The issue of their will is also broached, particularly in last rebuttal speech of the First 
Tetralogy. Though such witnesses, being logical figments, could never appear in 
court, their characterization sheds important light on the ancient Greek notion of 
‘witnessing’. Indeed, the very ability of Gorgias and Antiphon to deploy such argu-
ments shows that witnessing was, at least in this cases, not thought to be tied to the 
witness’s prestige or character which remain entirely undefined. Rather, their char-
acterization of a ‘witness’ as an individual who knows and who is motivated to testi-
fy implies that these were the features thought to fundamental to witnesses, whether 
real or fictive. 
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Introduction 
Debate persists as to the precise function of the ancient Greek witnesses 
in contemporary scholarship. In short, though witnesses are almost uni-
versally acknowledged to have been fundamental to arguing one’s case,1 
the precise function of a witness has been understood in two radically 
distinct ways.2 The traditional model attempts to foist onto witnesses, 
                                                 
1 SCAFURO (1994: 157); KENNEDY (1963: 89). CARAWAN (1998: 186) argues that they are 
also technically necessary. An important exception is LEISI (1907: 113). See also THÜR 
(2005: 147). 
2 I present both positions in the strongest possible terms even though most discussions 
are nuanced (e.g. TODD 1992: 27). Moreover, several refinements, most involving the 
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and through him to the ancient courts more generally, a concern for 
truth and truthfulness: witnesses are summoned in order to inform the 
court or – at least – to confirm facts which the litigant has mentioned in 
his narration.3 Under this paradigm, the witness is almost anonymous,4 
summoned not because of his prestige or position in society, but because 
he knows facts which are relevant to the case. Yet, it is clear, both from 
the procedural rules which governed the use of witnesses and also from 
the extant forensic speeches,5 that this paradigm must be incorrect or, at 
least, a hyperbole. On the other hand, several scholars have now gone 
far in the opposite direction, considering the witness to be summoned 
primarily because of who he is.6 Under this paradigm, witnessing is a 
‘socio-political ritual of support’7 and often far distant from any concern 
for the facts, quite beyond these rudimentary courts to discover.8 The 
role of a witness, in other words, was to show himself taking the liti-
gant’s side in the courtroom, and in so doing to lend to him all the social 
privilege that he has accrued from his ancestors and his standing in so-
ciety. Once again, a convincing case may be made against this extreme 
position.9 
The following paper is an attempt to grapple with this question, 
though in an admittedly unconventional way. I examine Gorgias’ De-
fence of Palamedes and Antiphon’s First Tetralogy and, in particular, home 
in on the figure of the ‘hypothetical witness’. These shadowy figures are 
the would-be bystanders and fictive witnesses which populate the εἰκός 
                                                 
use of statistical analysis, have now added greatly to the debate: esp. TODD (1992); 
RUBINSTEIN (2005); GAGARIN (2019). 
3 BONNER (1905: 27–38) and BONNER–SMITH (1938: 117–145) are the most important 
early sources. Similar, though more nuanced positions are given in CAREY (1994a: 183–
184), MIRHADY (2002) and O’CONNELL (2017). 
4 See esp. MIRHADY (2002: 262; 265). 
5 Most importantly, the classical position is related to an attempt to find a subpoena in 
the procedural rules. On this issue see TODD (1992: 24–25). 
6 HUMPHREYS (1985); TODD (1992). Cf. also THÜR (2005: 146), who argues that the ‘prin-
ciple of determining the truth was not primary’. COHEN (1995) also presents a similar 
picture, in which witnesses are by-products of political strife. 
7 TODD (1992: 27). 
8 COHEN (1995: 109). 
9 Esp. in CAREY (1994a: 183–184) and MIRHADY (2002: 262–263). 
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arguments found in these two works. Though no hypothetical person 
could, of course, be an actual witness – or anything else whatsoever – 
these figures shed crucial light on the author’s understanding of what it 
is to be a witness. In other words, I assume that these witnesses are hy-
pothetical, but not entirely fictional since they betray the author’s con-
cerns. What, then, are the qualities of these witnesses and how are they 
characterized? And how, in what cases and to what effects, do Gorgias 
and Antiphon employ this argumentative device? These are the ques-
tions I hope to address below. 
Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes 
Gorgias’ Defence of Palamedes is a ‘mytho-forensic’10 speech composed in 
the late 5th century.11 Though it has been relatively neglected until re-
cently,12 a number of scholars have now examined various aspects of the 
speech and, especially, its genre and purpose.13 There is, moreover, 
widespread agreement that the speech, though clearly modelled to suit 
its forensic backdrop,14 is a sophistic epideixis, one which showcases the 
infamous rhetorical abilities of Gorgias.15 In this respect, it resembles the 
other speeches and fragments attributed to a sophist who, as Goebel 
notes, never seems to have composed actual forensic speeches.16 None-
theless, many scholars attribute a second purpose to the speech, a di-
dactic one.17 Like Antiphon’s Tetralogies, the inherently antilogical18 Pal-
                                                 
10 KNUDSEN (2012: 33).  
11 On the date of this speech see SEGAL (1962: 100) and GOEBEL (1983: 143–145). 
12 A survey of the older literature on the speech is given by TORDESILLAS (1990: 241–
242). 
13 See UNTERSTEINER (2008: 202–203); KERFERD (1980: 78–79); and MCCOMINSKEY (1997: 
17–19) attempt to integrate the Palamedes with the rest of Gorgias’ writings. For a dif-
ferent view see LONG (1982: 243). See also TORDESILLAS (1990: 241–243). 
14 Unlike the Helen, therefore, it is delivered in the first person (GOEBEL 1983: 146–147) 
and constitutes, in effect, a defence speech in a mythical trial which adheres to the 
court conventions (KNUDSEN [2012: 34]). On the importance of the courts in sophistic 
thought also see GAGARIN (1994: 59) and LAMPE (2020: 117). 
15 E.g. KERFERD (1980: 78–79); GOEBEL (1983: 137); GAGARIN (2001: 287); KNUDSEN (2012: 
36). 
16 GOEBEL (1983: 137–138), referring to Dionysus of Halicarnassus.  
17 E.g. MCCOMINSKEY (1997: 18) KNUDSEN (2012: 38).  
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amedes showcases various rhetorical tropes19 which may be used by liti-
gants in court.20 Unlike the Tetralogies, however, the Palamedes is firmly 
set in the mythical past. Though this surely would have added a meas-
ure of poetic polish to an otherwise dry exercise of logic,21 it is also clear 
that Gorgias has grappled with the myth in a number of ways. Pala-
medes’s ἔθος, for example, is largely formed by a catalogue of inven-
tions attributed to the culture-hero.22 More importantly, at least for the 
purposes of this paper, Gorgias has tampered with the myth itself: he 
has removed the false evidence with which Odysseus is supposed to 
have secured his conviction.23 In effect, then, he has weakened his oppo-
nent’s case. And, considering the infamous Protagorean promise of 
making weaker arguments stronger,24 we may, perhaps, risk asking why 
this is. One suggestion is that of Goebel: he argues that this was a choice 
of mere convenience. By doing away with any hard evidence, Gorgias 
could give his argumentative imagination free reign.25 Similar observa-
tions have been made of the First Tetralogy. Nonetheless, it is notewor-
thy that Gorgias alludes to these two mythical pieces of evidence which 
he has omitted: the letter confirming the conspiracy and the gold plant-
ed under Palamedes’s tent. Indeed, he refers to them directly and grap-
ples with the significance of their absence. In view of their centrality to 
Gorgias’ argumentative display, noted below, I propose a different, 
though complementary, explanation for his choice. 
                                                 
18 As pointed out by GAGARIN (2001: 283). 
19 The Palamedes, for example, deploys the three classical types of ‘proofs’ as described 
by Aristotle. See BIESECKER-MAST (1994: 153); MCCOMINSKEY (1997: 18–19); KNUDSEN 
(2012: 37–38). 
20 GOEBEL (1983: 183–184), following SCHWARTZ (1892: 8), argues that it also serves to 
illustrate a model disposition. 
21 KNUDSEN (2012: 35). Knudsen’s paper examines Gorgias ‘competitive engagement’ 
with the poetic-mythical account of Palamedes. On this issue, see also LAMPE (2020), 
who also concentrates on the broader epistemological background of Gorgias’ recep-
tion of the poetic heritage. 
22 On Palamedes ἔθος see BIESECKER-MAST (1994: 153); SPATHRAS (2001: 400, n. 17); 
KNUDSEN (2012: 38); LAMPE (2020: 120). 
23 GOEBEL (1983: 146). 
24 GAGARIN (2001: 286–287) makes similar reflections. 
25 GOEBEL (1983: 146–147). For an alternative explanation, see GAGARIN (1994: 54). 
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Another prominent strand of scholarship on the Palamedes focuses 
more closely, instead, on the nature of the argumentation deployed by 
Gorgias,26 and with good reason: the Palamedes also appears to be a 
model exercise in rhetorical inventio.27 As such, and as already noted, 
Palamedes puts forth a number of topical arguments which could be 
deployed and adapted for actual court cases.28 Moreover, the Palamedes 
also opens up and explores new avenues of argumentation, very much 
in the vein of Antiphon’s Tetralogies.29 Thus, much of the first half of 
Gorgias’ Palamedes is dedicated to a complex and innovative argument 
in favour of the defendant’s innocence (Gorg. Pal. 6–21). Gorgias explic-
itly divides this long argument into two complementary halves (διὰ 
δισσῶν ὑμῖν ἐπιδείξω τρόπων, Pal. 5), the first purporting to show that 
the defendant could not accomplish the alleged crime even if he had 
wished it, the second that he had no reasonable motive to betray the 
Greeks even if he had the means to do so. In other words, he neatly jux-
taposes an argument dealing with opportunity and another which deals 
with motive.30 And linking the two arguments together is a concession: 
‘even if I wished it, I could not; and I could not even if I wished it’ (Pal. 
5). Concession is also the fundamental propulsive force of the first half 
of this argument dealing with means.31 Here, Gorgias divides the hypo-
thetical crime into a series of interlocking steps – meeting with Priam, 
speaking to him, exchanging sureties, and executing the plan – which 
                                                 
26 Gorgias’s argumentation is said to ‘trade mercilessly on the principle of the excluded 
middle’ (LONG [1984: 234]) and to make use of ‘antimonies’ (UNTERSTEINER [2008: 202]; 
SPATHRAS [2001: 398]). LONG (1982: 263, n. 4) also points out the frequent of Modus 
Tollens. Others have noted ‘arguments from exhaustion’ (GOEBEL 1983: 147) and the use 
of apagoge (GAGARIN [1994: 59]; SPATHRAS [2001: 406]). 
27 GOEBEL (1983: 146–147); MCCOMINSKY (1997: 17–18); GAGARIN (2001: 287). 
28 GOEBEL (1983: 146) and LONG (1982: 234) both consider it a ‘model speech’. Similar 
assessments in MCCOMINSKEY (1997: 17); TORDESILLAS (1990: 248–249) and GAGARIN 
(2001: 287). 
29 On the originality of the argumentative schema described see LONG (1982: 235–6). On 
the ‘inventiveness’ of these model speeches more generally, see GAGARIN (2001: 290). 
30 On this distinction, and its argumentative capital, see esp. LONG (1982: 223–225; 239). 
31 On this argument see esp. LONG (1982: 235–238) who names it a ‘Chinese box’ argu-
ment and SPATHRAS (2001: 406–407) who dubs it a ‘Russian doll’ argument. Similar 
analyses are given by GOEBEL (1983: 147–148); KNUDSEN (2012: 38) et al. 
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are considered sequentially and rejected. In each case, Gorgias moves 
from one disproof to the next by conceding, ex hypothesi, that the former 
steps ‘which could not have happened, happened’ (Pal. 11). In this first 
half of the argument, then, the defendant ‘shows’ that he could accom-
plish none of the steps necessary for the crime and in so doing creates 
the overwhelming impression that the task was completely beyond the 
realms of possibility.32 And while serial concession gives the argument 
its shape and much of its forcefulness, it is the appeal to εἰκός which 
does the heavy lifting of refutation.33 Indeed, at the most general level, 
the reconstruction of the crime is an εἰκός reconstruction: Gorgias must 
break down the overall crime into a series of plausible steps.34 More im-
portantly, each attack on an individual step is constituted by arguments 
which invoke εἰκός, whether explicitly, as in Pal. 9, or implicitly. In gen-
eral, then, we find Palamedes referring repeatedly to the physical and 
psychological improbability of the various actions which are implied in 
Odysseus’s accusation.35 As Gagarin notes, the prominence of εἰκός in 
this speech is at odds with Gorgias’ Helen, in which it is hardly found at 
all.36 But this very fact too may serve Gorgias didactic purposes: εἰκός is 
only relevant when the facts themselves are in question and, indeed, 
may constitute one’s only resource even when truth is on one’s side.37 
It is not incidental, then, testimony being the standard way of estab-
lishing facts in court, 38 that the figure of the ‘hypothetical witness’,39 
makes his appearance as a crucial part of this εἰκός argumentation, most 
explicitly in Pal. 7: 
                                                 
32 LONG (1982: 236) rightly considers the whole sequence an a fortiori progression. 
33 On the use of εἰκός in this speech, see GOEBEL (1983: 148–151); TORDESILLAS (1990: 
246–249); GAGARIN (1994: 54–55); SPATHRAS (2001: 384–387) and KNUDSEN (2012: 38–
39). 
34 On this point see MCCOMINSKY (1997: 18). 
35 Goebel’s analysis (1983: 148–151) of these arguments remains the most thorough. 
36 GAGARIN (1994: 54–55). SPATHRAS (2001: 395) makes the same point. 
37 GAGARIN (1994: 54). 
38 The relationship between testimony and demonstration is examined by O’Connell 
(2017: 86–90). 
39 These witnesses have been largely neglected in the literature. One notable exception 
Is SPATHRAS (2001: 397–398), who examines Gorgias’ use of witnesses by concentrating 
on the transformation of Odysseys into a witness in Pal. 23 (text below). 
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Yet let us grant, for the purpose of the argument (λόγος), that this be-
trayal was possible. And suppose further that, in some way, I am with 
him and he is with me. Yet who are these people but a Greek man and a 
barbarian? How, then, could they speak and listen to one another? 
Alone (πότερα μόνος μόνωι)? But we would not have understood one 
another (ἀγνοήσομεν λόγους). With an interpreter then? So a third 
witness is added to those things which must remain hidden (τρίτος 
ἄρα μάρτυς γίνεται τῶν κρύπτεσθαι δεομένων). (Gorg. Pal. 7)40  
This argument can be used as a paradigm of those deployed by Gorgias 
in the first half of his argumentative section referred to above. It starts, 
as already noted, with a concession: Gorgias grants, for the purpose of 
the λόγος, that Palamedes and Priam have somehow agreed to meet. 
Contrary to the preceding argument (Pal. 6), the two would-be conspira-
tors find themselves in each other’s company and are about to hammer 
out their traitorous plans. The question – indeed the rhetorical question 
– is how?41 Two options are envisaged, options which reappear else-
where,42 namely that the conspirators acted alone or in the company of 
others. The first option is rejected on a priori grounds:43 a Greek and a 
barbarian cannot actually converse with one another without an inter-
preter.44 A fortiori, the two could not have plotted together.45 The only 
possible option, therefore, is that they met with an interpreter, the hypo-
thetical ‘third witness’. This eventuality, however, comes at a heavy 
                                                 
40 All translations are my own. 
41 As SPATHRAS (2001: 395) notes, the possibilities ‘are proved to be invalid for practical 
reasons’. 
42 E.g. Gorg. Pal. 11 (see below). 
43 The argument bears comparison with Herodotus’ account of the foundation myth of 
DODONA (Hdt. 2, 44–45) which also invokes necessity and treats of the acquisition of a 
foreign language. 
44 In Homer, of course, no such difficulty is considered. More interestingly, the same 
can be said of Herodotus’ account (Hdt. 2, 112–120) and, indeed, of Gorgias’ own Helen 
where Paris’ λόγος is not only understood by Helen, but persuades her. 
45 The argument is spurious and trades on understanding Ἕλλην and βαρβάρος as 
absolute categories. In other words, the possibility that Palamedes or Priam learnt one 
another’s language in a decade-long war is not considered. Interestingly, language 
acquisition of Greeks and Barbarians was a standard topic of sophistic thinking. See 
GERA (2000). 
52 Jurgen R. Gatt 
 
price: a third person has been let in on the plans which should have re-
mained a secret.46 This, Gorgias implies, is equally a non-starter by the 
rules of εἰκός. 
Before discussing the qualities of this τρίτος μάρτυς, and just how 
his hypothetical existence constitutes a counterargument to the events 
discussed, it is worthwhile considering briefly the identity of the un-
mentioned ‘first’ and ‘second’ witness. Happily, two likely candidates 
are close at hand: the conspirators themselves. Though neither Priam or 
Palamedes were – nor could be – ‘witnesses’ in the literal sense of the 
word, the word μάρτυς may also be used to refer to an individual with 
privileged epistemological access to the events in question.47 In the pre-
sent case, the two conspirators would possess knowledge of their intent, 
of their plans, and of their imagined crime. In Greek, they would have 
possessed συνείδησις or guilty self-knowledge, a form of knowledge 
which is typically shared only with oneself or with one’s fellow co-
conspirators, but which can be extended to one’s accomplices, should 
they be needed.48 This, in fact, is what Palamedes argues would have 
had to happen in this case. What makes this interpreter a ‘third witness’, 
therefore, is his knowledge of the crime, a knowledge extended to him 
by the fact that the conspirators met in his presence and made use of 
him to communicate with one another.  
An alternative interpretation, however, is also possible. In the pre-
ceding section, Gorgias argues that the two alleged co-conspirators must 
first have met one another in order to communicate, and this could only 
be done by means of messages: 
                                                 
46 I place the argument concerning third witnesses firmly within the practical concerns 
of the εἰκός argument. As GOEBEL (1983: 150) notes, Gorgias does not appear to draw a 
firm distinction between physical and psychological improbability and, as the discus-
sion below makes clear, the hypothetical witness is invoked in both types of argument. 
For other interpretations of the third witness, see esp. BIESECKER-MAST (1994: esp. 155–
157) and LAMPE (2020: 118; 122–124). 
47 E.g. Antiph. 5.43. On the flexibility of the term μάρτυς see MIRHADY (2002: 256; 264) 
48 On the use of this notion in the forensic rhetoric of the late 5th century see GATT 
(2021). 
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And how could words have been exchanged if we were not in each 
other’s company? And how should such a meeting have taken place if 
he did not send a messenger to me (πρὸς ἐμὲ πέμψαντος), nor I to 
him (παρ’ ἐμοῦ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἐλθόντος)? For no message in writing 
can arrive without a courier (οὐδὲ παραγγελία διὰ γραμμάτων 
ἄφῖκται ἄνευ τοῦ φέροντος). (Gorg. Pal. 6) 
The exchange of messages, Palamedes argues, would have involved the 
creation of yet another two ‘hypothetical witnesses’: a messenger sent 
by Priam (πέμψαντος) to Palamedes, the other going (ἐλθόντος) in the 
opposite direction.49 These two messengers, therefore, could very well 
be the ‘first and second witnesses’ implied by the τρίτος μάρτυς of Pal. 
7. Though the argument tolerates both possibilities equally well, this 
reading has the benefit of emphasizing the cohesiveness of the first two 
arguments of the Palamedes. They are related not only in their theme – 
the impossibility of communication – but also by the gradual accumula-
tion of witnesses, a point to which I will return shortly. Whichever read-
ing is adopted, it is clear that the underlying logic of the two arguments 
remains the same. The only possible way in which the plan could have 
even got off the ground would have involved the creation of multiple 
witnesses, not only the interpreter through which the two conspirators 
must have communicated, but the messengers which they must have 
used to arrange the meeting in the first place.  
Messengers and hidden messages are, of course, standard tropes in 
Greek literature and already prefigured in the only sure reference to 
writing in Homer: the σήματα λυγρὰ carried by Bellerophon to his 
soon-to-be father-in-law (Hom. Il. 6, 168f.). They are also found in other 
myths, such as the traditional account of Palamedes’ condemnation. 
Nonetheless, Gorgias would surely not have lacked other 5th century 
prototypes of conspirators communicating via secret messages, the most 
famous – and ingenious – of whom come from Herodotus. In Hdt. 
1, 123, for example, Harpagus sends his most trusted messenger 
(θηρευτῇ τῶν οἰκετέων τῷ πιστοτάτῳ) to Cyrus with a message hid-
                                                 
49 The choice of a neutral term, ἐλθόντος, as opposed to one implying intent, 
πέμψαντος, is another mark of Gorgias’ great rhetorical skill. Even if such an exchange 
were to have taken place, we are to understand, then it was initiated by Priam. 
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den inside a butchered rabbit, taking care to tell the Persian to open up 
the animal with his own hands and when no one was present 
(αὐτοχειρίῃ μιν διελεῖν καὶ μηδένα οἱ ταῦτα ποιεῦντι παρεῖναι). Simi-
larly, in Hdt. 5, 35, Histiaeus, also fearing that a conventional message to 
Aristagoras would be intercepted on the heavily guarded Royal roads, 
branded his most trustworthy slave (τῶν δούλων τὸν πιστότατον) with 
a secret message on his scalp, let his hair grow back, and sent him to his 
co-conspirator with instructions to shave off the slave’s hair and exam-
ine his head (ξυρήσαντά μιν τὰς τρίχας κατιδέσθαι ἐς τὴν κεφαλήν). 
In both of these cases, and in agreement with Palamedes’ rule about 
plots (Pal. 6), written messages mark the beginning of grand conspira-
cies, the first resulting in the overthrow of the last Median King, the sec-
ond in the Ionian Revolt.50 And like Gorgias, Herodotus also refers to 
the great importance of secrecy. 
Yet Gorgias also had other, more mundane, and even more relevant 
prototypes of secret messages coming from the world of the courts. The 
alleged murder-plot in Antiph. 5, for example, also involves a messen-
ger remarkably similar to those mentioned in the Palamedes: 
The prosecution further allege (φασὶ) that they discovered on board a 
note stating that I had killed Herodes, which I had intended to send to 
Lycinus. But what need had I to send a note, when the courier himself 
was my accomplice (αὐτοῦ συνειδότος τοῦ τὸ γραμματείδιον 
φέροντος)? (Antiph. 5, 53) 
This argument is found in a ‘real’ forensic speech and seems to refer to 
an actual person.51 It may, therefore, give some meagre indication of the 
usefulness of alleging the discovery of such damning ‘secret messages’ 
in actual trials. More importantly, Antiphon’s argument has two signifi-
cant points of continuity with Gorgias’s mock-forensic speech. Firstly, 
the litigant reflects on the irrationality of manufacturing evidence, in 
this case the letter the prosecution claims to have discovered. Why, the 
                                                 
50 Interestingly, all three four stories mentioned involve, directly or indirectly, ‘barbari-
ans’ coming from the more literate world of the East. 
51 On the identity of the witnesses in Antiph. 5 see EDWARDS (1985: 89) and GAGARIN 
(1989: 59–63). 
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defendant asks, would he have taken the risk of sending his accomplice 
a written message, when the messenger already knew of the plot and 
could have informed Lycinus himself? The very existence of the mes-
sage – we are to infer – beggars belief because it violates the rational 
self-interest of the would-be criminal who, of course, does not want to 
be discovered. Thus, the defendant seeks to convince his jurors that the 
letter is a forgery since no rational criminal would have taken such an 
unnecessary risk.52 It is a similar calculation of self-interest which under-
lies the implausibility of Palamedes’s creation of hypothetical witnesses. 
And, once again, it is εἰκός which provides the crucial missing link. 
Since conspiratorial plans must remain secret – τῶν κρύπτεσθαι 
δεομένων – it would have been contrary to the rational self-interest of 
the conspirators to have engaged in any action which would have fur-
nished the prosecutor with so many witnesses to their crimes. And since 
the only possible plan must have involved the creation of witnesses, in-
deed many witnesses, Odysseus’ allegations are inherently ἀπεικός. No 
rational criminal would have acted in such a way. Secondly, Gorgias’ 
hypothetical witness and the alleged letter-bearing-messenger of An-
tiph. 5 are characterized in the same way: in terms of their knowledge. 
Antiphon’s messenger-accomplice, therefore, is described as συνειδώς. 
And though none of the first three witnesses encountered above are ex-
plicitly described as ‘συνειδότες’, one such reference characterizes yet 
another group of hypothetical witness to which Palamedes soon refers: 
And in doing this, did I do it myself or with others? But it is not a job 
for one man. With others then? Who? Clearly, my associates (δηλονότι 
τῶν συνόντων). Would these be free men or slaves? But you are my 
free associates (ἐλευθέροις μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν σύνειμι). Who, then, among 
you shares knowledge (ξύνοιδε) of this crime? Let him speak 
(λεγέτω). And as for slaves, how is one to trust them? Willingly would 
they make the accusation, in hopes of their freedom, and if not they 
would be forced to do so by torture (ἑκόντες <τε> γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερία 
χειμαζόμενοί τε δι’ ἀνάγκην κατηγοροῦσιν). (Gorg. Pal. 11) 
                                                 
52 Antiph. 5, 53–56. 
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Once again, we find ourselves following a familiar line of argument. 
Gorgias first questions the ability of the conspirators to bring their plans 
to fruition without the help of some accomplices, whether free men or 
slaves. Secondly, these necessary accomplices – who must now share in 
the knowledge of the plans and in their συνείδησις – automatically as-
sume another identity: they are potential witnesses who could provide 
Odysseus with the clinching proof that he needs. Indeed, it is this very 
knowledge which qualifies them as μαρτύρες. And, once again, the un-
derlying assumption of the argument is the εἰκός ‘rule’: a criminal 
wants to remain undetected and, thus, makes sure that which must re-
main a secret remains hidden: τῶν κρύπτεσθαι δεομένων. There is, of 
course, one important difference between the three witnesses discussed 
above and this fourth group: their identity is more ‘concrete’ and, there-
fore, somewhat less hypothetical. In more precise terms, their role is not 
merely that of accomplice and witness, but also audience-member, per-
haps even juror of the imaginary trial.53 As such, they are addressed di-
rectly by the defendant and invited to testify against him. Indeed, they 
are addressed once again, and in similar terms, at a later point in the 
speech: 
Are you accusing me with accurate knowledge, or are you just guess-
ing (τῶν κρύπτεσθαι δεομένων)? And if you know, then you must 
have seen, you must have taken part in it, or you must have learnt of 
it from some accomplice of mine (ἰδὼν ἢ μετέχων ἤ του 
<μετέχοντος> πυθόμενος). And if you saw, then, tell these men the 
way, the place, the time! When? Where? What is it that you saw? And 
if you took part, then you are subject to the same blame. And if you 
heard it from someone who did take part, who is he? Let him come 
here himself. Let him speak. Let him testify! (Εἰ δέ του μετέχοντος 
ἀκούσαις, ὅστις ἐστίν; αὐτὸς ἐλθέτω, φανήτω, μαρτυρησάτω.) 
(Gorg. Pal. 22) 
Again, we must note that the precise role of this hypothetical witness is 
different to those already discussed. Not only is he an accomplice 
(μετέχοντος) and a potential witness (μαρτυρησάτω), he would also 
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have informed Odysseus and granted him sure knowledge. The under-
lying assumption of both these open invitations, however, is that they 
are unanswered, indeed unanswerable. Palamedes is, after all, innocent. 
In both cases, therefore, the invitation makes the crucial point that all 
the hypothetical witnesses mentioned so far, the messengers, the inter-
preter, the accomplices in the camp, are just that, mere hypotheses with 
no actual existence. Indeed, Palamedes will soon criticize Odysseus ex-
plicitly for lacking any testimonial support for his allegations (Gorg. Pal. 
23). It is against the backdrop of this argument that Palamedes’ invoca-
tion of numerous hypothetical witnesses is best understood. Gorgias 
defends Palamedes not merely on the grounds that the actions discussed 
are contrary to the self-interest of a rational criminal because they are so 
eminently discoverable, but he also identifies those witnesses which 
Odysseus has failed to summon should the crime have really taken 
place. And since the only possible plans, laid out by Palamedes in the 
process of his argument, must have necessarily involved the creation of 
several witnesses on which Odysseus could have hypothetically called, 
the lack of any actual witnesses can only mean one thing: no such plans 
were ever laid down. This is because, as Palamedes tells his opponent, 
witnesses were not only possible in his case, they were ready-at-hand 
had the crime been committed (Gorg. Pal. 23). Indeed, it is not only wit-
nesses that are invoked in such a way, but evidence of every sort. Thus, 
just in the passages invoked above, Palamedes’ conspiracy would have 
generated letters and slaves to be tortured via the βάσανος. Moreover, it 
would have involved the exchange of sureties, such as gold, which 
would have been discovered, and breaches in the wall that everyone 
would have seen. In other words, Odysseus would have the evidence 
which he was said to have fabricated in the traditional account of the 
Palamedes-myth, and more besides. By removing these pieces of evi-
dence from the equation, then, Gorgias has doubly underlined this im-
portant and likely original argument: the only way in which Palamedes 
could have betrayed the Greeks would have created a veritable moun-
tain of evidence which would have condemned him. No sane criminal 
would have gone through with such a plan. Moreover, should they have 
done so, contrary to all reasoning, Odysseus would have not only pos-
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sessed a ready means of knowledge, the accomplices, but also been able 
to prove them guilty beyond any doubt by means of witnesses, both free 
and unfree, letters, gold, and evidence of all sorts. His inability to do so, 
as well as the fact that Palamedes repeated invitations for hypothetical 
witnesses to testify go unanswered, ‘proves’, by a classical Modus Tollens 
and by the use of ‘negative signs’,54 that Palamedes is innocent. In other 
words, by identifying these would-be hypothetical witnesses and ‘key’ 
pieces of evidence, Palamedes catalogues the way in which his oppo-
nent has failed to demonstrate his guilt. 
Yet as it stands, the argument from hypothetical witnesses, though 
undoubtedly ingenious, is invalid, and this for interesting reasons. In 
short, Palamedes must assume, though he nowhere argues, that any 
witness who possessed knowledge would have actually testified in 
court. No witness could have lied and no bystander would have failed 
to answer his summons. In other words, the various motivations which 
could have influenced Palamedes to betray the Greeks are like nothing 
when it comes to the hypothetical witness. No gold, no enmity or 
friendship, no fear of retribution would have convinced a witness to 
remain aloof. If he were to exist, Gorgias must assume, a witness is 
simply an automaton who would make himself available to Odysseus 
and answer Palamedes’ invitations without reservation. Interestingly, he 
does raise the issue of a witness’s motivation once, with respect to the 
slave, and this only to argue that a slave would surely have given him 
up, either because he was motivated by gain or by torture. Once again, 
then, the existence of a knowledgeable accomplice is simply assumed to 
give Odysseus his proof under all imaginable circumstances. This, of 
course, is a questionable assumption at best, but one which, perhaps, 
can be explained by the ambiguity of the term μάρτυς to which we have 
already referred. A μάρτυς, then, may simply refer to a person with 
privileged epistemological access to the facts of the case. In this sense, 
any accomplice, by possessing knowledge of the crime, is also a ‘wit-
ness’ in this limited sense. From here, it is a simple matter of equivoca-
tion to argue that any accomplice is also a ‘witness’ in the stricter, more 
forensic sense of the word. The lack of forensic witnesses at the actual 
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trial, therefore, is taken to imply the lack of any knowledgeable ‘wit-
nesses’ whatsoever. And since the plans must have involved accomplic-
es and ‘witnesses’ in the limited sense, Gorgias can sophistically claim to 
have disproved the accusations. To see how a clever prosecutor could 
disentangle this sophistic web, we must turn to the antilogies of Anti-
phon’s First Tetralogy. 
Antiphon’s First Tetralogy55  
The First Tetralogy is a hypothetical who-done-it in which the mock-
defendant stands accused of murdering a rival of his. As in the Pala-
medes, the main issue of the trial and the subject of much of the argu-
mentation of the four speeches concerns a matter of fact:56 the two mock-
litigants cannot agree on the identity of the murderer. As a consequence, 
much of the speeches addresses this basic question and relies, often ex-
plicitly, on εἰκός. The mock-prosecutor, however, does have one piece 
of direct evidence, the testimony of a slave-witness who died shortly 
after the assault, but as in the Palamedes, the author appears to have de-
liberately constructed a weak case for the prosecution.57 In so doing, An-
tiphon has occasioned for himself the perfect opportunity for develop-
ing a series of εἰκός arguments across the back-and-forth which en-
sues.58 Indeed, the Tetralogies are typically read as a showcase for this 
type of argumentation.59 Thus, as with the Palamedes, we not only find 
argumentative τόποι adapted for the case, but also such experiments as 
the reverse-εἰκός argument, pioneered by Tisias and Corax, which does 
not seem to have been used much in court.60 What is more pertinent for 
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the discussion at hand, however, is the fact that the author addresses 
directly the relationship of εἰκός and testimony. On this point, Goebel 
and Gagarin agree that the author draws a firm distinction between 
merely probable arguments which appeal to εἰκός and factual proof 
provided by witnesses.61 At Antiph. 2, 4, 10, then, the mock-defendant 
opposes the actual (ὄντως) murderer as revealed by witnesses and the 
merely probable (εἰκότως) accusations made by his rival. He does this 
in the train of introducing witnesses at the very end of his defence, ones 
which he claims can prove that he is innocent in point of fact, rather 
than by εἰκός: οὐκ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ δηλώσω. The introduc-
tion of the witness at the end of his second speech is undoubtedly bi-
zarre62 and would have shocked the mock-jurors. As Gagarin notes, 
however, it’s ‘shock value’ may well be calculated: Antiphon can show 
that with the introduction of the witnesses, we have finally come to an 
ἔργον which sweeps away the multitude of εἰκός arguments which pre-
ceded it.63 And yet, as Gagarin himself notes,64 and as Wohl has shown 
in greater detail,65 there is also, and running parallel to this stark distinc-
tion, a persistent conflation of the εἰκός and testimony, one which leaves 
the door open for hypothetical witnesses to enter into the courtroom. 
The prosecutor, for example, after drawing the very distinction men-
tioned (esp. Antiph. 2, 1, 1), conflates the two with one another, arguing 
that the circumstantial details have ‘informed’ against his opponent: 
First of all, it is unlikely that a mugger would have killed the man. For 
no-one would endure the gravest of perils and be ready to risk his life 
and then, when the deed is done, leave his reward behind him. And 
the victims were found still wearing their cloaks. Nor is it likely that 
he was killed in a drunken brawl, for such a killer would have been 
known by his fellow revellers (ἐγιγνώσκετο γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν 
συμποτῶν). Nor was it the result of some quarrel, for who could have 
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quarrelled during the night in such a deserted place? Nor, finally, 
could have he been killed in error, for such a man would not have also 
killed the slave. And thus, with every other possibility being dis-
missed, the death itself informs us that he was the victim of a murder-
plot (αὐτὸς ὁ θάνατος ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς ἀποθανόντα μηνύει αὐτόν). 
(Antiph. 2, 1, 4–5) 
It is clear, even from this argument alone, that Gorgias and the author of 
the First Tetralogy are drawing on a common stock of logical tricks and 
argumentative tropes. At its most general level, the εἰκός argument is 
explicitly based on the assumption that the criminal is a supremely ra-
tional actor (see esp. Antiph. 2, 2, 4–5, below), one who behaves only in 
accordance to a cold calculation of his own self-interest. Thus, the fact 
that the cloak was found on the victim – a fact which no defendant 
could reasonably contest – is presented as a sufficient indication 
(σημεῖoν, Antiph. 2, 2, 4) that muggers are not responsible for the crime 
since they would not have forgotten to actually rob the corpse. No sane 
criminal, the mock-prosecutor implies, would have killed for profit and 
then forgotten to take his prize. The argument here is also an apagoge 
and one which involves an analysis of the various possible motives for 
the homicide. As such, it takes the same shape of Gorgias’ examination 
of the defendant’s motives in the second half of the Palamedes, as well as 
that of the grand argumentative strategy in his Encomium to Helen.66 The 
mock-prosecutor’s aim, of course, is rather different to that of the ‘de-
fendant’ in either of these speeches. While Palamedes examines all the 
possible motives to demonstrate that none can be reasonably imputed to 
him, the mock-prosecutor here argues that the victim must have been 
murdered because no other motive fits the facts of the case. It is because 
of this that he concludes that the death itself, by which he means the 
circumstantial details which are beyond dispute, ‘informs’ (μηνύει) 
against the murderer. Εἰκός here has become a surrogate witness for the 
prosecution. This, however, is not the only ‘conflation’ of the two pisteis. 
Thus, though the figure of the hypothetical witness is far more explicit 
in the back-and-forth which follows from this apagoge, we already get a 
                                                 
66 SPATHRAS (2001: 406). 
62 Jurgen R. Gatt 
 
whisper of him here. The second possibility, namely that the victim was 
killed in a drunken brawl, is dismissed altogether because the would-be 
killer would have been recognized, ἐγιγνώσκετο, by his fellow revel-
lers. This possibility, the mock-prosecutor implies, can simply be dis-
missed because it would have involved the creation of witnesses, people 
who knew. And as with the Palamedes, these hypothetical witnesses are 
simply assumed to be a source of evidence against the would-be killer 
had they existed, even though they would, presumably, have been the 
friends of the offender and also very drunk. 
In the subsequent speech, however, the defendant does not pick up 
on any of these problems and chooses, rather, to focus on the first possi-
bility: 
But it is not unlikely, as they say, but likely (ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἀπεικός, ὡς 
οὗτοί φασιν, ἀλλὰ εἰκὸς) that he was killed in the small hours of the 
night by some prowler and for his cloak. For the fact that he was found 
clothed is no proof at all (οὐδὲν σημεῖόν ἐστιν). If they, fearing the ap-
proach of someone (τινας προσιόντας φοβηθέντες), left before strip-
ping him, the muggers would have been sensible and not insane to pre-
fer their own safety to their prize (ἐσωφρόνουν καὶ οὐκ ἐμαίνοντο τὴν 
σωτηρίαν τοῦ κέρδους προτιμῶντες). (Antiph. 2, 2, 4–5) 
The aim of this argument is clear. By appealing to the same calculus of 
self-interest, one which opposes sanity (ἐσωφρόνουν) and insanity 
(ἐμαίνοντο) in a way reminiscent of the Palamedes (Gorg. Pal. 25), the 
mock-defendant attempts to imagine a scenario in which a mugger 
could still be guilty and leave the cloak behind him. In so doing, he 
seeks to undermine the force of the apagoge by showing that his oppo-
nent has dismissed this possibility inappropriately. The scenario imag-
ined, moreover, also involves hypothetical ‘witnesses’ who wander over 
the scene of the crime (τινας προσιόντας) and scare off the criminal be-
fore he has had time to rob the victim.67 In this way, the mock-defendant 
shows that the ‘proof’ his opponent has presented comes to naught since 
a mugger could still be involved. The mugging could, after all, have 
been botched by the sudden and unexpected appearance of some nosey 
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parker. As in Gorgias’ Palamedes, therefore, the defendant conjures up 
hypothetical witnesses in order to defend himself. Unlike Palamedes, 
however, Antiphon’s mock-defendant does not attempt to show that he 
could not have committed the crime because it would have necessarily 
involved ‘third witnesses’ and accomplices – it is agreed that there could 
be none (Antiph. 2, 1, 1)68 – but rather conjures up bystanders to argue 
that others could have been implicated. Moreover, the hypothetical wit-
nesses conjured are merely ‘possible’, perhaps even unlikely, and by no 
means necessary to the scenario imagined, as they are in Palamedes. Yet, 
since Antiphon is here not deducing anything from their absence, mere 
possibility is all he needs to make his point. 
The mock-prosecutor comes to the defence of his apagoge early in his 
rebuttal speech: 
For if the killers, having seeing some people approaching, left and 
abandoned their victims, fleeing before they stripped them, then those 
who chanced upon (οἱ ἐντυχόντες) them would have found the slave 
alive even if the master was already dead. He did, after all, testify af-
ter he was picked up. It is clear, then, that these men would have 
questioned the slave and passed on the identity of the perpetrators to 
us (σαφῶς ἀνακρίναντες τοὺς ἐργασαμένους ἤγγειλαν ἂν ἡμῖν). 
And if this were the case, then this man would not now be ascribed 
the blame. (Antiph. 2, 3, 3) 
The mock-prosecutor’s argument is, once again, closely related to the 
known circumstances of the crime and is, in effect, a mere elaboration of 
the original scenario depicted in his first speech. Had bystanders hap-
pened onto the scene, he argues, we would know about it. The slave, 
who was still alive, would have denounced his attacker to these hypo-
thetical by-standers and they, in turn, would relayed this testimony to 
its proper place, to the victim’s home and to his relatives. As a result, the 
defendant would have never been blamed since the real perpetrator – 
the mugger – would have been identified and prosecuted. The prosecu-
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tion would have known – much as Odysseus should have known – where 
the guilt actually lay. Once again, then, the mock-prosecutor simply as-
sumes that any bystander who would have seen the mugging would 
have made his testimony public. In this, Antiphon’s mock-prosecutor 
and Palamedes agree. 
It is in response to this challenge that the mock-defendant of Anti-
phon’s First Tetralogy offers Odysseus a convincing counter to Pala-
medes’ argument. We note, then, that in the process of the dialectical 
back and forth, the mock-prosecutor has had to ascribe ideal qualities to 
the hypothetical bystander: he diligently collects information from the 
slave, proceeds to report it to the relevant parties, and, presumably, ap-
pears in court when summoned as a witness. Worse still, the defendant 
implies that these qualities are universal. Any bystander who would 
have come across the scene would have behaved in such a way. All the 
wily orator had to do, therefore, is challenge one, or more, of these ques-
tionable assumptions: 
They say that each and every one of those who would have happened 
upon the victims while they being assaulted would, rather then flee, 
be more likely (εἰκότερον εἶναι) to accurately investigate (σαφῶς 
πυθόμενον τοὺς διαφθείραντας) who the murderer was and then 
carry the news to the victims’ home (εἰς οἶκον ἀγγεῖλαι). Yet I know 
no one who is so hot-headed and brave (ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδένα οὕτω θερμὸν 
καὶ ἀνδρεῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι δοκῶ), and who would not turn round 
and flee when coming across men on the very point of death and at 
night rather than endanger his own safety by inquiring about the 
murderers (φεύγειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυνθανόμενον τοὺς κακούργους 
περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κινδυνεῦσαι). Since these would-be witnesses then 
are more likely to have fled, as is reasonable (εἰκότως ἀφίοιντο), it is 
no longer necessary to dismiss the possibility of men who would have 
murdered to rob the pair. So I have been freed of suspicion. (Antiph. 
2, 4, 4–5) 
The idealized behaviour that the mock-prosecutor has had to foist on 
every passer-by, the mock-defendant now argues, is not as universal as 
his opponent claims. Indeed, it is not even εἰκός. When the ‘hypothetical 
bystander’ introduced in his former speech is suddenly and unexpected-
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ly confronted by a mugging scene, the mock-prosecutor plausibly ar-
gues, it is more reasonable (εἰκότερον) that he would prefer his own 
safety to investigating the crime: φεύγειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυνθανόμενον. It 
is not merely knowledge, therefore, which characterizes the real, as op-
posed to a merely hypothetical witness. At least in this scenario, he must 
have been brave, even hot-headed. More generally, then, a witness must 
be ‘motivated’ to discover the truth and then testify. And this, the mock-
prosecutor explains, carries risk: κινδυνεῦσαι (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1376a14–
15). The examination of an agent’s motivation by means of εἰκός, which 
has occupied much of the prosecution’s case as well as Palamedes’ de-
fence, has been finally foisted on the witnesses themselves. In so doing, 
Antiphon has levelled an important and devastating challenge to the 
defendant’s apagoge. More importantly, Antiphon has attributed to the 
hypothetical witness a second important trait: a will. 
Conclusion 
A number of conclusions can now be drawn from the use and character-
ization of these would-be witnesses. Firstly, it is clear that both Gorgias 
and Antiphon assume that in summoning witnesses, a litigant is fur-
nishing evidentiary material supportive of his own case. Thus, in the 
Palamedes, the availability of witnesses is grouped with other sorts of 
evidence that Odysseus would possess had Palamedes really been 
guilty. The prosecutor of the First Tetralogy, on the other hand, justifies 
his use of εἰκός on the grounds that he could not demonstrate his claims 
to be true by means of witnesses, while his opponent explicitly relies on 
witnesses to demonstrate his innocence in the final part of his rebuttal 
speech. Secondly, the hypothetical witness is one prominent figure en-
listed to help in this εἰκός back and forth. Moreover, the analysis has 
demonstrated that this argumentative scheme possesses great flexibility 
and may be used by both sides of a case and to various effects. It is also 
noteworthy that both Gorgias and Antiphon show considerable ingenui-
ty in adapting the argument to the specifics of the case. There is, howev-
er, one important caveat to this flexibility: like real witnesses, hypothet-
ical witnesses – as a species of εἰκός argument – are used only when the 
facts are in dispute. Thirdly, the close association of εἰκός and testimony 
also underlines the porousness of the Aristotelian categories of proof. As 
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the brief reference to Antiph. 5 shows, then, hypothetical witnesses can 
be invoked even to counter a non-technical pistis: a letter. Above all, 
however, the characteristics of the hypothetical witness sheds some light 
on the role of actual witnesses or, at least, on the broader category of 
‘witnessing’. Thus, to start off with, it is already telling that there is such 
a figure as a hypothetical witness. It is clear, in other words, that at least 
on these occasions the precise identity of the witness and his non-
existent relationship to the litigant is unimportant to his status as a ‘wit-
ness’. Moreover, the characteristics which are imputed to these would-
be witnesses are entirely impersonal and not related, in any significant 
way, to a question of his status, respectability, or ‘socio-political’ affilia-
tions with the litigants. What does characterize these witnesses, rather, 
are two things: his knowledge of the things to which he is testifying and, 
secondly, his willingness to testify. In this, perhaps, the hypothetical 
witness comes far closer to our own sanitized notions of a ‘witness’ in a 
modern trial than does any flesh-and-blood witness summoned into the 
messy world of the Athenian courts. 
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